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CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Larry Evans •
Jarrell Wright • •
Neal Devins • • •

ight years ago, a seemingly uneventful Supreme Court decision, Chevron,
1
USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, prompted a watershed debate over
the role of administrative agencies in ascertaining legislative intent. In Chevron, a
unanimous Supreme Court recognized broad agency power to interpret often
ambiguous statutory language, holding that' 'permissible'' agency interpretations
are controlling unless Congress has spoken to "the precise question at issue. " 2
Counterbalancing this apparent elevation of agency interpretation at the expense
of judicial interpretation, however, Chevron made clear that judicial analysis of
legislative history is wholly appropriate in determining legislative intent: "If a
court, employing traditional tools of statutory consideration, ascertains that Congress had
an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must
be given effect. " 3
Chevron's recognition of a potentially broad judicial role likely explains the
Court's unanimity. It also explains why, as Judge Patricia Wald observed in
her analysis of post-Chevron decisionmaking, the Supreme C"ourt still relies on
legislative history in many of its statutory construction cases. 4 Chevron has nonetheless caused a firestorm by suggesting that electorally accountable agencies take the
lead in filling in the gaps left behind by the Congress rather than "[j]udges [who]

E

• Associate Professor of Government, College of William and Mary.
•• Associate, Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, J.D., 1992, Marshall-Wythe School of Law,
College of William and Mary.
••• Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary.
1. 467 u.s. 837 (1984).
2. !d. at 843 nn.9 & 11.
3. ld. at 843 n.9 (emphasis added).
4. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the
1988-89 Term of the United States Suprtml! Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277, 288 (1990). Chevron's invocation
oflegislative history suggests that a result-oriented judge can easily work around the decision. William
N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 675 (1990); Antonin Scalia, judicial
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 520-21 (1989); R. Shep Melnick,
Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 245, 252-53 (1992). Chevron, if anything,
has prompted the D.C.·Circuit to make greater use of legislative history. See John F. Belcaster, The
D. C. Circuit's Use of the Chevron Test: Constructing a Positive Theory ofjudicial Obedience and Disobedience,
44 ADMIN. L. REV. 745 (1992).
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are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the
Government.' ' 5 This incendiary rhetoric prompted more .aw review articles than
anyone would care to read in a lifetime6 and, more signific:mtly, has led the House
and Senate Judiciary Committees to examine the Chevrou doctrine. 7
The battleground over Chevron raises both fundamental talance-of-powers issues
and more pedestrian concerns over what, if anything, can be learned by examining
legislative history materials. The nuanced and detailed b<Jance-of-powers debate
has thus far proven the focus of attention. The empirical debate, in contrast, often
seems like a ''Yes You Can, No You Can't'' shouting match. This article considers
an unexamined aspect of this empirical debate, namely, tlte critical role played by
the internal procedures of Congress in shaping legislative output. Our purpose is
to raise some previously unexamined issues about existing conceptualizations of
legislative intent and to relate these issues to the controvt-rsy concerning Chevron.
Although we raise more questions than we can answer witlt rigor, we believe that it
is crucial for jurists and legal scholars to better incorporate tJ 1e richness and complexity of the legislative process into their arguments about st ltutory interpretation.
In this article we argue the following: A key aspect of the Chevron doctrine is the
notion that courts can usually ascertain legislative intent, albeit with great difficulty.
As often is the case with positions occupying the middle ground, the Chevron decision
has drawn fire from two divergent sets of critics. One lined criticism (the "textualist'' position) holds that courts cannot ascertain legislative tntent from nonstatutory
sources. The textualists argue that the legislative process i:: too volatile and the concept of legislative intent may be meaningless, absent clear directions in statutes.
The other line of criticism (the ''traditionalist'' position) holds that Chevron actually
underestimates the ability of judges to ascertain legislative intent from nonstatutory
sources and that the Chevron doctrine induces courts to shirk their responsibility to
fully scrutinize the actions of administrative agencies.
This article, in contrast, argues that the' 'middle grounc ''approach of the Chevron
doctrine reflects very well the practical exigencies of the kgislative process in Congress. We base our argument on a richer notion oflegislltive intent than existing
commentaries about Chevron. Specifically, we describe how congressional procedures can influence and stabilize legislative outcomes. Wt reject radical critiques of
nonstatutory interpretation such as that articulated by Justice Scalia. 8 However,
we also demonstrate that the means through which congrc:ssional procedures shape
legislative outcomes vary from issue to issue and over time, depending on a wide
range of contextual factors. As a result, it is very difficult fc·r judges to make accurate
5. 467 U.S. at 865.
6. See, e.g., Russell C . Weaver, A Foolish Consistmcy is the Hobgobl'n of Little Minds, 44 BAYLOR L.
REv. 592 ( 1992); Jerry L. Mashaw, TexiUillism, Constitutionalism, and I \e Interpretation of Federal Statutes,
32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 827 (1991); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Int..-rpretation and the Balance of Power
in the Administrative State, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 452 (1989); Alfred C. i•man, Jr., Administrative Law in
a Global Era: Progress Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrativt Presidmcy, 73 CoRNELL L. REV.
1101 (1988) .
7. See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History, Hearin~ before the Subcomm. on the Courts
of the Comm. on thejudiciary, IO!st Cong. , 2d Sess. (1990) .
8. See infra notes 17-21.
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predictions about how Congress would have acted when the relevant statutory language is vague or nonexistent. In short, a greater sensitivity to the role of procedure
in Congress supports the Chevron doctrine and points the way to a more empirically
grounded conceptualization oflegislative intent in other areas of the law.
We proceed in three phases. Section I is a descriptive summary of the debate
over whether nonstatutory sources are useful or necessary for understanding congressional intent. The relevance of congressional procedure to this debate is underscored. In Section II, the relevance of congressional procedure to this debate is
emphasized and an empirical overview is provided of perhaps the most important
aspect of congressional procedure: control over the agenda. Finally, in Section
III we explore the significance of our argument for the debate over Chevron and
existing conceptualizations of legislative intent.

I. The Debate Over Legislative Intent
The "ferment" surrounding Chevron has placed administrative agencies
squarely in the middle of an increasingly furious cross-fire over the interpretation
of federal statutes. 9 As noted previously, this debate has largely crystallized around
the two central themes of Chevron: normative concerns about the constitutional
balance of powers and the empirical question of what relationship legislative history
actually bears to "legislative intent." Although the emergence ofthese two themes
has resulted in a bifurcation of the debate, which has run its turbulent course in
two relatively independent streams, the overall debate remains cohesive. The
battle lines that have been drawn in the Chevron controversy have defined two
distinct camps-roughly termed "textualist" and "traditionalist"-that retain
their identity with regard to issues arising under each theme .
A.

BALANCE oF PowERs

Chevron scholarship has placed inordinate emphasis on the balance-of-powers
aspects of the decision. This focus can perhaps be best explained by the fact that
the legal community is far more familiar and comfortable with the concepts and
vocabulary underlying the balance-of-powers debate than with the concept of
legislative history and the process of its production, a realm that has generally been
left to the arena of political science. In any event , balance-of-powers issues played
a critical role in the Chevron decision, and a discussion of the debate on this issue
is necessary for a full understanding of the empirical issues.
The textualist position. Textualists are not troubled by Chevron's apparent elevation of the agency role over the judicial role when legislative intent is unclear .
Rather, this camp argues that judicial consultation oflegislative history is inappropriate and leads to an imbalance of powers among the three branches of government.
Although a statute is subjected to the constitutional requirements of bicameralism
and presentment, the legislative history accompanying the statute is not. 10 As are9. &t Mashaw, supra note 6.
10. Thompson u. Thompson, 484 U .S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); Puerto Rico Dept.
of Consumer Affairs u. Isla Petroleum Corp. , 485 U .S . 495 , 501 (1988).
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suit, legislative history cannot be said to have the force of11w in the strict constitutional sense, and judicial reference to nonstatutory sources permits Congress to exert lawmaking authority in a manner beyond that contemplated by the
Constitution. 11 Likewise, the role of the courts is to interpret the law, i.e., statutes,
and not to decode the extra-legal documents comprising a statute's legislative history or to ''reconstruct legislators' intentions.' >1 2 Therefor•:, exhaustive judicial use
oflegislative histories amounts to an abdication of the judiciary's constitutional role.
Furthermore, textualists suggest that a paramount agency role actually affirms
and strengthens traditional notions of separation of powers. Claiming that
"statutory interpretation must not only avoid exces;es condemned by the
Constitution, but should also be conducted 'in a fas.1ion which fosters that
democratic process,' " 13 textualists argue that agencie; are better suited than
courts to fill in gaps left open by Congress.
The traditionalist position. Traditionalists argue thc.t judicial consultation of
legislative history is consistent with the proper balance oJ'powers. Chevron's elevation of the agency role in statutory interpretation is viewed as an abdication of the
judiciary's central responsibility to say "what the law is. " 14 Furthermore, the
enlargement of executive power resulting from the displacement of judicial review
by agency interpretation is a source of trouble to traditionalists. 15 Finally, traditionalists assert that Congress does not overstep its role wh~n it produces legislative
history. The requirements of bicameralism and presentment only prevent Congress from exercising veto authority over the executive. But these constitutional
considerations do not render nonstatutory sources irrel~vant in determining the
intent of Congress when it enacts measures pursuant to constitutional procedures.16
11. In other words, Congress must express its intent through statui ory language, or not at all. This
formalistic argument was also used to invalidate the legislative veto m INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
( 1983). If one house of Congress cannot dictate policy to the Preside 3t through a resolution that has
not met the requirements of bicameralism and presentment, then it rray not dictate the interpretation
of the law to the courts through the use ofunenacted legislative history. Kenneth W. Starr, Observations
About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DuKE L.J. 371, 375. See also Wald, supra note 4, at 307.
12. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 921, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. RE\'. 417, 419 (1899) ("We do not
inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute m ~ans.' ').
13. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 677 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. 2413, 2424 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring)).
14. William Eskridge uses the phrase "traditionalists." Eskridge, supra note 4. Cass Sunstein uses
the phrase ''contextualists.'' Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in !he Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 407 (1989). Eskridge and Sunstein both emphasize judicial autonomy in criticizing Chevron.
Eskridge, supra note 4, at 674; Sunstein, 103 HARV. L. REv. at 43·).
15. See Farina, supra note 6.
16. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 671-72 ("Consulting [committee rc:ports] does not violate bicameralism or presentment any more than would consulting a dictionary.''). Indeed, it has been argued that
textualism increases the likelihood that substantive results will be inconsistent with the desires of the
elected branches as evidenced by compliance with the commands oi' bicameralism and presentment.
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statute;: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of
Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1314 (1990).
Traditionalists, moreover, dispute textualists claim that judicial J·eliance on legislative history improperly expands legislative power. Traditionalists emphasize th<ct legislative history is produced
publicly and that the President has an opportunity to review it in determining whether or not to sign
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The key empirical differences between textualists and traditionalists regard the
question of what-if anything-can be learned from an examination oflegislative
history. This empirical question lies at the heart of Chevron. If legislative history
is a reliable predictor of legislative purpose, courts should be more willing and
more likely to find that Congress has spoken to' 'the precise question at issue.'' Put
another way: Courts, not agencies, will define statutory purpose when Congress is
found not to have left a gap in its statutory scheme. In contrast, iflegislative history
is unreliable, courts should be more hesitant and less likely to find a specific
congressional intent. Instead, courts should be more willing to validate' 'permissible" agency constructions of unclear legislation. Textualists and traditionalists
offer fundamentally different appraisals of this empirical question.
The textualist position. The textualist critique of Chevron argues that nonstatutory sources like committee reports and agency interpretations are irrelevant in
ascertaining legislative purpose. 17 By allowing a reviewing court to stray from
statutory language to employ' 'traditional tools of statutory construction'' to ascertain [c]ongressional intent "on the precise question at issue," 18 Chevron perpetuates, rather than curtails, judicial reliance on untrustworthy sources. 19 Textualists
argue that legislative history presents, at best, a distorted view of the legislature's
intent, and, at worst, a counterfeit description of what the legislature actually had
in mind when it voted on a statute. Predicating their arguments upon empirical
assumptions of legislative behavior, specifically the manner in which legislators
and their staffs generate a statute's legislative history, the textualists conclude that
the statutory text is the most reliable source for discerning legislative will.
Textualists suggest that legislative history is not necessarily representative of the
true preferences of the legislature. 2° Committee reports, the most frequently cited
sources of congressional intent, are not written by the legislators themselves, but
rather by their staffs. 21 Compounding this lack of direct involvement is the fact that
members of Congress often have only superficial familiarity with the contents of
committee reports and other nonstatutory sources of information, such as floor debates

a bill into law. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 92 (1991); Daniel A. Farber & PhilipP. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74
VA. L. REV. 423, 457 (1988).
17. The most visible textualist is Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. For Scalia's explication
of his position, see Scalia, supra note 4. For assessments of Scalia, see Eskridge, supra note 4; Arthur
Stock, Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: How Congress Always
Loses, 1990 DuKE L.J. 160.
18. Chevron, 467 U.S. 843, 847 n.9.
19. This is the basis ofJustice Scalia's criticism of the majority opinion in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 454-55 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
20. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,610 (1987) (Scalia,J., dissenting); REED DICK·
ERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (1975).
21. Justice Scalia has quoted at length from an actual exchange on the Senate floor supporting the
assertion that the legislators themselves are seldom actively involved in the drafting of committee
reports. See Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1, 8 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting 128 CoNe. REc. S8659 (daily ed. July 19, 1982)). For a critique of
this assertion, see Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, supra note 16.
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and hearings. 22 Indeed, committee reports are seldom read by legislators and are
never subjected to an up or down vote. Therefore, the statutory text-the only source
that was subject to the immediate approval or disapproval of legislators-provides the
only reliable indication of what most members intended \\hen they voted. 23
Not only do textualists contend that legislative historr is a poor reflection of
legislative intent, they also argue that it can be deliberately skewed in order to
influence subsequent judicial interpretation. Members of Congress frequently
engineer floor debates that are not designed to persuade or inform their colleagues.
Rather, these exchanges are targeted for a judicial audience, which will later
examine these debates to gauge what the institution itself actually "intended"
when it enacted the legislation. 24 Senate debate on major civil rights legislation in
1991 illustrates the potential for strategic manipulation of legislative history. With
an eye to influencing future court action, Democrats aad Republicans, during
floor debate, articulated highly different interpretations o:' the standards regarding
what constitutes "business necessity" in hiring decisions The lawmakers eventually had to place a three-paragraph memo in the Congressi mal Record to serve as the
"exclusive legislative history. " 25 Such inclusions in the record are relatively rare,
however, and textualists argue that the strategic manipulation oflegislative history
typically goes unnoticed and unchallenged.
Congressional staffers, according to the textualists, are even more prone to
committing this offense than are their employers. The minimal involvement of
legislators in the process of drafting report language pl.iCes heavy responsibility
on their staffs, who actually prepare the committee reports. Because of the intense
scrutiny such reports are subjected to in the courts, there is incentive for staffers
to load these sources .26 An overzealous staff member, or •me susceptible to interest
group influence, may find it both tempting and uncomplicated to pack the committee report with information that, if later relied upon by courts, would effectively
change the meaning of the statute Congress actually en acted. 27 As Justice Scalia
has argued: "What a heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to know that

22. Hirschey, 777 F.2dat 7 (Scalia,]., concurring)("! frankly doubt t 1atit iseverreasonabletoassume
that the details, as opposed to the broad outlines of purpose, set forth i11 a committee report come to the
attention of, much less are approved by, the house which enacts the committee's bill.''); Green v. Bock
Laundry Machine Co., 490 U .S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia,] ., concurring) ("I find no reason to believe
that any more than a handful of the Members of Congress ... (if ar. y) voted ... on the basis of the
referenced statements in the Subcommittee, Committee, or Confere11ce Committee Reports, or floor
debates."). See also Zeppos, supra note 16, at 1310.
23. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29 (1989)(Sca tia,J., concurring in part); Reed
Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1125, 1130 (1983).
24. See WilliamS. Moorhead, A Congressman Looks at the Planned Coli< quy and Its Effect in the Interpretation
of Statutes, 45 A.B.A. J . 1314 (1959).
25. Joan Biskupic, Skirmish Over Spin, CoNG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3204, Nov. 2, 1991.
26. "[The) routine deference to the detail of committee reports, and the predictable expansion in
that detail which routine deference has produced, are converting a sy;tem of judicial construction into
a system of committee-staff prescription." Hirschey, 777 F.2d at 8 (Scalia, J., concurring). See generally
Starr, supra note II; Zeppos, supra note 16; Melnick, supra note 4; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chlvron and
its Aftermath: judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisim s, 41 VAND. L. REV . 301 (1988).
27. American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1192 n .: :2 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Hirschey v.
FERC, 777 F.2d I, 7·8 (D.C . Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J ., concurring); f~ichard J. Pierce, Jr. , Thl Role of
the judiciary in Implementing an Agency Thlory of Government, 64 N.Y.tr. L. REv. 1239, 1258 (1989).
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his or her citation of obscure district court cases can transform them into the law
of the land, thereafter dutifully to be observed by the Supreme Court itself.' ' 28
The traditionalist position. Traditionalists take issue with the textualist assertion that legislative history is fundamentally unreliable. In defending the reliability
of legislative history, traditionalists have challenged the empirical assumptions
supporting reliance on the text alone. According to advocates oflegislative history,
the textualist view of the legislative process is' 'jaundiced'' and overly pessimistic, 29
reflecting a narrow view of ''legislators at their worst.' ' 30
Traditionalists argue that members of Congress not only are familiar with the
information in committee reports, but in many cases are familiar with little else. 31
Anecdotes about congressmen who fail to read the statutes they vote on are legion.
Legislators look to committee reports for voting cues and rely on the information they
provide. As a result, traditionalists maintain that committee reports are a credible
source for determining what the intent of Congress was when the bill was enacted. 32
Traditionalists also present an array of arguments that the legislative process does
not result in active misrepresentation of congressional intent. They accuse Scalia and
others of ascribing too much power, too few constraints, and too few scruples to
congressional staffers and interest groups. Staffers are not potential renegades pursuing their own personal agendas in the legislative process; substantial evidence demonstrates that they generally adhere to the preferences of their elected employers. 33
And even if the textualist position is correct and the staff system is susceptible
to abuse, then this is simply an argument for cautious and thoughtful use of
nonstatutory sources rather than a basis for entirely disregarding legislative history. 34 Indeed, the delegation of power to congressional staff is part of a larger
system that is supported by the elected representatives and thus reflects the way
Congress prefers to operate. 35 And because committee reports are central to the

28. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
29. FARBER & FRICKEY, LAw AND PUBLIC CHOICE, supra note 16, at 95; Eskridge, supra note 4, at
679-81.
30. Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, supra note 16, at 437.
31. FARBER & FRICKEY, LAw AND PuBLIC CHOICE, supra note 16, at 98; ERIC REDMAN, THE DANCE
OF LEGISLATION 140 (1973); Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, supra note 16, at 445.
32. See RICHARD PosNER, THE FEDERAL CouRTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 269-70 (1985).
33. See George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions": The Relative Reliability
of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DuKE L.J. 39, 67; Farber
& Frickey, Legislative Intent & Public Choice, supra note 16, at 425-3 7. Traditionalists also note that staff
members are as closely involved with the drafting of the statutory text as they are with the drafting
of committee reports. Zeppos, supra note 16, at 1312-13.
34. FARBER & FRICKEY, LAw AND PuBLIC CHOICE, supra note 16, at 99; Farber & Frickey, Legislative
Intent and Public Choice, supra note 16, at 448; Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power:
The Case for a Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63 TuLANE L. REv. 1, 24 (1988). See also William N.
Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Jr., Statutory Intepretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN L. REv. 321, 353
(1989) (a model of interpretation based on relative reliability of intrinsic and extrinsic sources); Zeppos,
supra note 16, at 1323 (statutory text, as well as legislative history, is subject to manipulation).
35. FARBER & FRICKEY, LAw AND PuBLIC CHOICE, supra note 16, at 98-99 ("What [the role of
committee stall] should be is, however, surely the primary concern of the legislative rather than the
judicial branch."); Costello, supra note 33, at 66-67; Wald, supra note 4, at 306-07 ("[t]o disregard
committee reports as indicators of congressional understanding ... is to second-guess Congress'
chosen form of organization and delegation of authority, and to doubt its ability to oversee its own
constitutional functions effectively.")
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judicial interpretation of statutes, there is little possibility that interest groups or
staffers would be able to egregiously slant reports without the knowledge of other
factions, who have strong incentives to monitor the drafting process. 36
Traditionalists not only defend the value of nonstatutory sources as a general
proposition, but also argue that consultation oflegislative history can prove useful
in virtually all circumstances, including those where it is not directly on point.
When a statute and its legislative history fail to confront an issue that confounds
subsequent interpreters, a judge should choose the interpretation that ( 1) most
likely reflects the wishes of the enacting legislature and ( 2) is the most beneficial
reading of the statute. 37 Under this approach to statutory interpretation, "[t]he
characterization of legislative purpose is an act of crea:ion rather than discovery.' ' 38 This technique has been defended on the grounc.s that direct evidence of
legislative intent on any given issue is rarely available. 39 ,\ccordingly, traditionalists argue that Chevron's emphasis on evidence that is direc :lyon point misconstrues
the fundamental nature of statutory interpretation. 40

*

•

*

* * *

In short, the dominant contenders in the contemporary debate over statutory
interpretation can be considered extremes on a continuum. Textualists reject both
the credibility and the legitimacy of legislative history i:1 illuminating legislative
intent. Some even question the fundamental concept of a coherent legislative
intent. 41 Traditionalists, in contrast, not only defend t1e value of nonstatutory
sources as a general proposition, but also argue that consultation of legislative
history can prove useful in virtually all circumstances, including those where it is
not directly on point. The Chevron formulation lies somt:where close to the center
of this continuum. Although recognizing that nonstatutory sources can facilitate
an interpreter's task, Chevron refuses to credit nongermane legislative history with
persuasive force.

36. Costello, supra note 33, at 67 ("(T]he possibility of appending mdividual views to a committee
report serves both as leverage and as a safety valve against committ• :e reports that do not represent
accurately the views of a committee majority.").
37. FARBER & FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE, supra note 16, at J02-06. In other words, the court
"must take into account both the odds of being right and the consequences of being wrong." /d. at
103. For similar formulations, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note ::3, at 329-30 (1990) ("(W]here
Congress has written a statute broadly or where its concerns do not aJJ, lW us to reconstruct its imagined
intent, courts should simply seek the most reasonable interpretation.''). PosNER, supra note 32, at 287
(''[A] judge must imagine as best he can how the legislators who enact< d the statute would have wanted
it applied to situations they did not foresee.").
38. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 427.
39. See Peter C. Schanck, The On(y Game in Town: An Introductwn to Interpretive Theory, Statutory
Construction, and Legislative Histories, 38 KAN. L. REv. 815, 819 (1990); DICKERSON, supra note 20 at 154.
40. See Kenneth W. Starret al. ,judicial Review ofAdministrative Actio:! in the Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN.
L. REv. 353, 368-69 (1987) ("Statutory construction is not a search for direct decision of precise
questions.''); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative i 'upremacy, 78 Gw. L.J. 281, 286
( 1989) (' '[T]he same considerations that make language and intent b: nding when they are clear entitle
them to judicial attention when they are unclear."); Frank H. East:rbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U.
CHI. L. REv. 533, 551 (1983).
41. Easterbrook, supra note 40, at 545-48.
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Therefore, each side in the debate has sought not only to undermine the contentions of its counterpart, but also to argue convincingly that the current state of the
law should be modified to reflect its own positions. One relevant issue yet to be
considered is how the internal procedures of Congress make legislative history
more or less predictable. For example, if party and committee leaders wield enough
power to consistently control legislative outcomes, leadership-produced legislative
history-as traditionalists argue-would be an accurate measure of legislative
purpose. In contrast, if the significance of leadership preferences are not predictable, leadership-produced legislative history-as textualists claim-would be indeterminate. The following section will examine a central aspect of procedure in
Congress-agenda control-so that we can better evaluate the reliability of nonstatutory sources as indicators of legislative intent.

II. Agenda Control and Legislative Intent
By all accounts, the internal procedures of Congress are relevant. For purposes
of analysis, procedure is defined in this study as any formal rule or precedent that
sets jurisdiction, the distribution of legislative resources, the range of admissible
policy alternatives, the order of consideration, or the manner in which policy
disagreements are to be resolved. 42 Agenda prerogatives, which pertain to the
range of admissible alternatives and the order of consideration, are perhaps the
most significant subset of congressional procedure.
Congressional procedure is crucial because it influences the processes through
which the policy preferences of individual legislators are aggregated into policy
outcomes. Consider the reauthorization of the Clean Air Act, one of the most
volatile items on the congressional agenda during the 1980s. 43 Efforts to reauthorize the program failed on the floor of the Senate in 1988, but legislation was passed
in the Senate in 1990. In this case, as in many others, the outcome was determined
by who controlled the agenda. The two key players in the Senate were George
Mitchell (Dem.-Maine) and Robert Byrd (Dem.-West Virginia), with Mitchell a
vocal advocate of tighter acid rain controls and Byrd a staunch opponent because
of the likely impact on West Virginia's coal-intensive economy. During the tOOth
Congress (1987-88), Mitchell chaired the subcommittee on jurisdiction and led
the fight to reauthorize the Clean Air Act. But Byrd, as majority leader, controlled
scheduling on the Senate floor, and he was successful in blocking final passage of
the reauthorization in 1988. 44 At the beginning of the lOlst Congress, however,
Byrd stepped aside as majority leader-and was replaced by George Mitchell. The
Clean Air Act was successfully reauthorized within two years. 45
As this example suggests, congressional procedure is seldom neutral. The inter42. On the general importance of procedure in Congress, see TERRY SuLLIVAN, PROCEDURAL STRUCTURE: SUCCESS AND INFLUENCES IN CONGRESS (1984).
43. An in-depth description is provided in RICHARD E. CoHEN, WASHINGTON AT WoRK: BAcK
RooMs AND CLEAN AIR (1992).
44. !d. at 36-44.
45. /d. at 81-98.
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nal structure of Congress affects the substance of policy ou :comes because it creates
an uneven distribution of power in the institution-part:! leaders and committee
chairs, for example, often have distinct policy-making ad,rantages over their rankin-file colleagues. To a certain extent, the rules and institutions of the Congress
simply embody and promote a division of labor that enhances the institution's
efficiency. 46 But they also reflect trading off between diff ~rent legislators, or what
has been termed an "institutionalized logroll:" legislatcrs have disproportionate
resources in the issue areas they care the most about. 47
It should be emphasized, however, that congressional structure is fundamentally
majoritarian, even if its policy implications are seldom n'!utral. 48 Under Article I,
§ 5 of the U.S . Constitution, the members of the House md Senate organize their
respective chambers, and the rules, procedures, and institutions of each chamber
can be altered by a majority of the relevant membershii'· Consequently, congressional structures can be conceptualized as "congealed preferences. " 49 And policy
outcomes in Congress depend on both issue-specific pn ferences about policy and
these less transitory preferences about structure . .
Although the importance of procedural rules in Congress is widely recognized,
the implications for statutory interpretation have not b!en adequately addressed.
Judges and legislators instead tend to focus on preferences-on the policy views
of key legislators. However, because the language in .1 statute is determined by
the views of legislators combined with the procedures thr )ugh which such views are
aggregated, the concept oflegislative intent should embrace both preferences and
procedures. Individual policy preferences are relativel) meaningless until they are
combined within the legislative process and translated into law, and the internal
institutional arrangements that Congress has developed structure this process
of preference aggregation. Therefore, even if it is possible to discern subjective
individual preferel\ces about unresolved policy issues, chis is not enough to predict
how Congress as a whole would have settled the question. In order to reconstruct
''legislative intent,'' a determination must be made )f how the internal mechanisms of Congress would have channeled those prefere 1ces into a statutory format.
The political science literature on congressional pr,>eedure is massive, but it is
apparent that the linkages between policy preference~, procedural arrangements,
and legislative outcomes can be subtle and dynamic , often evading efforts at precise
quantification and prediction. Many related factors influence how individual pref46. See, e.g. , Joseph Cooper, Congress in Organizational Ptrspectil e, in CoNGRESS RECONSIDERED 140
(Lawrence C . Dodd & Bruce j. Oppenheimer eds., 1977); KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGIS·
LATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991).
4 7. The literature in this area is vast. On the institutionalized logroll as it pertains to agricultural
policy, see john Ferejohn, Logrolling in an Institutional Context: A Case Study of Food Stamp Legislation, i11
CoNGRESS AND PoLICY CHANGE 223 (Gerald C. Wright, Jr. et al. eds., 1986). More generally, see
DAVID R. MAYHEW, CoNGREss: THE ELECTORAL CoNNECTION (19' 14); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional
Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions, in PoLITICAL SciENCE: T" E SCIENCE OF PoLITICS 51 (Herbert
F. Weisberg ed . , 1986); Barry M. Weingast & William J. M:.rshall, The Industrial Organization ~~
Congress, 96 J . PoL . EcoN. 132 (1988).
48. See KREHBIEL , supra note 46.
49. &e gentrally William H. Riker, Implications from the Disequi !fbrium of MaJority Rule for tht Study <if
Institutions, 74 AM . PoL . Sc1. REv. 432 (1980) .
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erences are assembled into laws. As a result, judicial interpreters cannot rely on
a general principle that will enable them to decipher reliably the "intent" of the
legislature with respect to unresolved issues. The internal structural characteristics
of Congress can confound judicial attempts to reconstruct legislative intent when
statutes are ambiguous or incomplete.
A complete accounting of the implications of congressional procedure for judicial
efforts at discerning legislative intent is well beyond the scope of a single article.
As a result, in this section we focus on a central aspect of congressional procedurethe distribution of agenda prerogatives, although most of our arguments can be
extended to congressional structure in general.
A. AGENDA PREROGATIVES

As mentioned, "agenda control" refers to actions that influence which policy
alternatives are considered and the order in which they are considered. Manipulation of the agenda can directly influence policy outcomes, but, as is the case
more generally with political power in Congress, the power to manipulate the
institution's agenda is remarkably decentralized. No single individual or institution in Congress possesses the power to control the agenda at every stage in the
legislative process. And because each chamber of Congress sets its own rules, the
distribution of agenda prerogatives in each is different.
Even a cursory overview of lawmaking in Congress demonstrates the extent to
which agenda prerogatives are widely dispersed. The first stage in the cycle of
legislation is referral. In the House of Representatives, the Parliamentarian, working with the Speaker, refers newly introduced legislation to one or more issuespecific committees, and party leaders perform the same function in the Senate.
Depending on the jurisdictional boundaries of the committees and the subject of
the proposed legislation, a bill may be referred to a single committee, to two or
more committees simultaneously, or to two or more committees sequentially. 50
Referral decisions in the Senate are more informal, with party leaders playing key
roles. But in both chambers of Congress, the decision about how, where, and when
to refer legislation (a form of agenda control) is highly significant because most
legislative work occurs in committee, and the action a committee takes on a bill
often determines its ultimate fate. 51
The nature of the committee referral process decentralizes the agenda-setting
function in Congress. Standing committees in the House and Senate have fixed
jurisdictions, which are formally denoted in House Rule X and Senate Rule XXV.
Jurisdictional alignments in the House and Senate are similar, but not identical,
50. Although legislation is usually referred to standing committees of the House, on particularly
complex items the Speaker has the power to form an ad hoc committee constituted for that legislation
alone.
51. For example, the 1964 Civil Rights Act was referred to the House judiciary Committee and the
Senate Commerce Committee. Why the difference? At the time, the chairs of the House Commerce and
Senate Judiciary Committees were staunch opponents of civil rights, and, as a result, moving the
legislation through these alternate panels kept it from being killed in committee and improved the
chances of passing the legislation. See WALTER j. 0LESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE
POLICY PROCESS 86-87 (3d ed. 1989).
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and they correspond roughly to the organization of the various executive departments. 52 However, major issues often fall within the jurisdiction of more than one .
panel-thus the need for the referral of legislation to multiple committees.
There are countless examples of overlapping committee jurisdictions in Congress. Immigration legislation, for instance, although prin 1arily within the jurisdiction of the House judiciary Committee, has also been referred to the Committees
on Agriculture and Education and Labor. 53 Twelve Home committees have some
jurisdiction over environmental issues. 54 During the 19:30s, the issue of nuclear
waste disposal was claimed by the House Committees on Energy and Commerce,
Science and Technology, and Interior and Insular Affairs, among others. In the
Senate, legislation to authorize the Superfund program has been considered by
the Committees on Environment and Public Works, Finance, and Judiciary.
Trade issues are rife with jurisdictional overlaps. Durmg the lOOth Congress,
for example, fourteen House committees and nine St nate committees shared
jurisdiction over one major trade bill .55
Jurisdictional overlaps and the mounting complexity of many pressing policy
concerns have resulted in a steady increase in bills referred to more than one
committee of the House and Senate. Indeed, the percer.tage of multiple referrals
in the House has grown from just 6 percent in the 94t'1 Congress to 14 percent
in the 99th Congress. With major legislation, the incidence of multiple referral is
even higher. 56 Since the congressional agenda is largely set in committee, on many
measures jurisdictional overlaps and the practice of mdtiple referral combine to
ensure that a wide range of actors in both chambers can exert agenda control at
this crucial stage of the legislative process.
After referral to the relevant committee or committet:s, initial legislative action
begins with the scheduling of hearings and, later, with bill writing sessions (called
markups) where amendments are introduced and vote:; are cast. Agenda control
is important at this stage in the process because a bill that does not receive a place
on the committee's agenda is a bill that probably will not pass. For instance, a
committee leader who dislikes a measure may refuse tc schedule it for committee
consideration . Alternatively, he may postpone conside:.·ation indefinitely in order
to preclude the bill's passage 57 or may delay scheduling until valuable concessions
regarding the bill's substantive content are received. F articularly toward the end
of a session, even short delays can mean defeat for a r•iece of legislation. Once a

52 . CHARLES TtEFER, CoNGREssiONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE : A REFERENCE , RESEARCH, AND
LEGISLATIVE GuiDE 71 (1989).
53. ld. at 72.
54. See RoGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER]. 0LESZEK, CoNGRESS AND ITs MEMBERS 212 (3d ed. 1990).
55. See id. at 213 .
56. On the incidence of multiple referrals, consult Roger H. Davidson et al., One Bill, Many Committees: Multiple Referrals in the U.S. House of Representatives, 13 LEGIS . STUD. Q. 3 (1988); Melissa P. Collie
& Joseph Cooper, Multiple Referrals and the "New" Committee Syste n in the House of Representatives, in
CoNGRESS RECONSIDERED 245 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce] . O~penheimer eds., 4th ed. 1989).
57. Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Changing Time Constraints in Congress : Historical Perspectives on the Use of
Cloture, in CoNGRESS RECONSIDERED 343 (Lawrence C . Dodd & BJUce J. Oppenheimer eds. , 3d ed.
1985). See also 0LESZEK, suprf! note 51; C . LAWRENCE EvANS, LEADERSHIP IN CoMMITTEE (1991) .
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bill is placed before the panel, the chairman controls the gavel, and thus retains
significant authority over the pace, order, and content oflegislative business. For
example, observers of the House Energy and Commerce Committee regularly
comment on how quickly Chairman john Dingell's (Dem.-Michigan) gavel can
fall when he opposes an amendment or a procedural motion. 58
As with referral powers, the distribution of agenda prerogatives in committees
varies between chambers. In the House of Representatives, initial committee
action tends to occur in an issue-specific subcommittee, while the smaller and more
collegial Senate finds it more practical to manage business in full committee. 59 As
a result, legislation in the House must pass through two levels of agenda control
procedures-one in subcommittee and one in the full committee-while most
critical decisions in Senate committees are made at the full committee level.
Although full committee and subcommittee chairmen have extensive power to
control the flow of business in their panels, other committee members can avail
themselves of procedures to dislodge an item that has been stalled by the leadership.
There can be significant practical consequences and political costs to overruling
a committee leader who, after all, has the power to make future decisions that
may undermine a dissident member's interests and give him cause to regret his
rebellion. Such mechanisms are, therefore, rarely used, but they remain available
for high salience issues and their potential impact cannot be overlooked.
Following completion of committee action, legislation moves to the floor, where
it is also subject to the perils of the agenda. The impact of agenda control on floor
deliberations is more profound in the House than the Senate. For measures in the
House that cannot be assigned to the Consent Calendar or passed quickly by suspension of the rules, 60 the House Rules Committee provides a resolution, or ''rule,''
that sets the terms of floor consideration. 61 Although the contents of these resolutions vary from bill to bill, they typically control the time-limits on debate, the
distribution of floor time to individual members, the number and types of amendments that will be allowed, the order in which these amendments will be considered, and the quantity of floor time allocated to each amendment. Nongermane
amendments usually are not permitted.
Although the Rules Committee has formal control over the agenda for floor
deliberations in the House, the Speaker exerts considerable influence over what
gets scheduled and the terms of debate. Since 1975, the Speaker has nominated
58. See, e.g., David Maraniss, Powerful Energy Panel Turns on Big John's Axis, WAsH. PosT, May 15,
1983, at AI.
59. Relative to the House, subcommittee markups are less common in the Senate due to greater
demands on the time of individual senators. The Senate's policy agenda is similar in size to that of
the House, but the Senate has less than one fourth the membership. As a result, Senate committees
often remove one stage, the subcommittee markup, from the process to conserve member time. See
generally, STEVENS. SMITH 11< CHRISTOPHER]. DEERING, CoMMITTEES IN CoNGRESS (2d ed. 1990); EvANS,
supra note 57, 73-105.
60. The Consent Calendar and suspension of the rules are procedures employed on noncontroversial
measures.
61. A useful summary of House floor procedure is provided in 0LESZEK, supra note 51, at chs. 5,
6. For recent changes, consult STANLEY BAGH & STEVEN S. SMITH, MANAGING UNCERTAINTY IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: ADAPTATION AND INNOVATION IN SPECIAL RULES (1988).
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all majority party members of the Rules Committee, subject to approval by the
Democratic Caucus. As a result, the panel is often described as an ''arm of the
leadership" and usually promotes the Speaker's interests 62 House "rules" inevitably affect the nature of the substantive outcomes of tht: legislative process. For
example, rules can be tailored to the specific purpose of g~tting a measure bogged
down in unpopular amendments or can streamline the process of consideration so
that passage of the bill is expedited.63
Relative to the House floor, agenda prerogatives on the floor of the Senate are
widely dispersed. There is no formal analog to the House Rules Committee in the
Senate. 64 Most Senate business is conducted by unanimous consent because the
formal rules of the institution are relatively cumbersome. 65 When legislation is
brought to the Senate floor, a member, typically the m:tjority leader, stands up
on the floor and requests action on an item by unanill}Olls consent. If no senator
objects, the motion carries. As a result, individual senat•Jrs have enormous influence over the pace and direction of floor action in their institution. By systematically objecting to requests for unanimous consent, a senlltor can often block items
he or she opposes. Indeed, a member can bring the institution to a grinding halt. 66
These procedural prerogatives of individual senators are rooted in the filibuster,
which is the central weapon in a senator's procedural arsenal. 67 By extending
debate, introducing scores of amendments, or repeated!~' requesting quorum calls
and roll call votes, a senator can block floor action on a piece of legislation. Of
course, a filibuster can be curtailed by invoking cloture, but this requires 60 votes,
as well as considerable time and effort. As a result, particularly toward the end
of a session or as a recess approaches, the mere threat of a filibuster can be sufficient
to derail a measure.

• • • • • • • • • •
In summary, the potential for agenda control prerog<·.tives to play a central and
often determinative role is manifest at all stages of the legislative process in both
the House and Senate. However, the exact manner in which these prerogatives
influence the legislative process varies by chamber anc1stage of the process, and
62. Bruce I. Oppenheimer, The Rules Committee: New Ann of Leaiership in a Decentralized House, in
CoNGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 57.
63. BACH & SMITH, supra note 61.
64. Unlike the House Rules Committee, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration is
essentially an administrative panel, with jurisdiction over matters such as committee funding and
campaign finance reform. The Senate Rules Committee is not respor sible for structuring floor debate .
65. For discussions of unanimous consent agreements in the Senotte, consult R . Keith, "The Use
of Unanimous Consent in the Senate," in Committees and Senate Proctt!ures, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 1977,
140-68; 0LESZEK, supra note 51, at 177-238; STEVENS. SMITH, CAlL To ORDER: FLOOR PoLITICS IN
THE HoUSE AND SENATE 86-129 (1989). See a/so BARBARA SINCLAII:, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE (1989).
66. The collegial nature of the Senate deters individual member; from asserting this prerogative,
i.e., "go along to get along. " However, the infrequency with whicl , the prerogative is exercised does
not change the fact that it is available and is used .
67. The last in-depth analysis of the Senate filibuster was pro~ided by FRANKLIN L. BuRDETTE,
FILIBUSTERING IN THE SENATE (1940). For recent trends, consult]. Calmes, Trivialized Filibuster Is Still
A Potent Tool, CoNG. Q. WKLY. REP., Sept. 5, 1987, at 2115-20; SINCLAIR, supra note 65.
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generalization is difficult. The power to manipulate the agenda is dispersed, particularly in the Senate. Furthermore, many opportunities exist for legislators to
counter agenda control efforts by their colleagues in and out of the leadership. The
following two cases illustrate the problems presented by the nature of agenda
prerogatives in Congress for those seeking to reconstruct legislative intent.

B.

CASE STUDIES

68

Agenda Control in Committee. The first case study pertains to the potential importance of agenda prerogatives during the committee stage of the congressional
process. Certain aspects of agenda control in committee were apparent during
Orrin Hatch's (Repub.-Utah) chairmanship of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources from 1981 to 1987. Hatch led a partisan majority of
nine Republicans to seven Democrats. But the Republican majority included two
senators-Lowell Weicker (Repub.-Connecticut) and Robert Stafford (Repub.Vermont)-whose policy preferences often resembled those of committee Democrats. As a result, liberals had more votes on the committee than did conservatives
like Hatch. Hatch's strategic response as chairman was to restrict the committee's
agenda and exclude what he feared would be an avalanche of liberal initiativesinitiatives the chairman otherwise would have been unable to defeat because he
lacked a majority of the votes. As Hatch later recalled, "[t]here was constant
pressure from the Democrats on the agenda, and they were very good at it to give
them credit. ... But I controlled the agenda. As long as the Democrats wanted
something, they had to be accommodating.' ' 69 Democrat Howard Metzenbaum
(Dem. -Ohio), also a committee member, echoed Hatch's comments: "The chairman of the committee didn't have the votes to control his own committee . . . .
Senator Hatch's style was to use the schedule-not putting items on the calendar,
not pushing things. " 70
Chairman Hatch's agenda prerogatives often had a significant impact on the
content of committee outcomes, but evaluating the magnitude of this impact
requires a subtle understanding of committee politics because it varied from issue
to issue depending on the distribution of preferences in committee.
First, there were certain issues considered in the Labor Committee during the
Hatch chairmanship in which existing law fell between the preferences of Hatch
and the two pivotal voters-Hatch favored moving policy to the right, while
Stafford and Weicker favored more liberal alternatives to the status quo. The
distribution of preferences on many labor, health, and civil rights issues resembled
this configuration. Under these conditions the passage of conservative bills was
not possible-the only policy changes that could muster majority support were
movements away from Hatch's preferences toward the views of committee liberals.
With respect to these issues, Hatch employed the rational response of closing the
gates and denying access to the full committee agenda. For example, in 1985,
68. The material in this section is adopted from EvANS, supra note 57.
69. /d. at 67-68.
70. /d. at 68.
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Hatch resisted scheduling an initiative sponsored by ran:cing Democrat Edward
Kennedy (Dem.-Massachusetts) which would have extended the health insurance
coverage oflaid-off employees, widows, and divorcees. Hatch realized that liberals
in the Labor Committee might have the votes necessary to report the legislation
to the full Senate and he favored no action on the Kenr.edy measure . 71
In contrast, consider the case in which the preferences of Hatch and the two
pivotal voters supported positions to the left of existing law, with Stafford and
Weicker favoring more liberal alternatives than did the chairman. Legislation
considered by Weicker's Subcommittee on the Handicapped often fell into this
category. In this instance, the chairman's response wa; to threaten to block a
proposal if it was not modified before full committee markup. Although Hatch
wanted legislation, simply opening the gate to these bill:: would have resulted in
departures from existing law that were more radical than he favored. In these
instances, the result often was a compromise amendmenc acceptable to the chairman. For example, in 1985, Lowell Weicker introduced legislation authorizing
$10 million to support advocacy programs for residents of mental institutions.
Hatch wanted to pass a bill aiding the institutionalized m!ntally ill, but he favored
greater reliance on existing state programs. As a result, Hatch refused to schedule
Weicker's bill for full committee consideration until ce1tain changes were made
in the draft. After some procedural sparring, a Hatch-\Veicker compromise was
achieved and the legislation was placed on the Labor Committee agenda and
reported to the full Senate without opposition. 72
The Senate Labor Committee during the Hatch chairmanship demonstrates
why agenda practices can confound efforts to predict legislative intent on unconsidered issues. Clearly, we could not have gauged the "intent" ofthe Labor Committee when its legislation was ambiguous by examining member preferences alone.
The policy views of Stafford and Weicker best reflected the mood of panel members, but, as we have seen, committee policy typically d.verged from their preferences toward those of Orrin Hatch because of the chairman's strategic management of the agenda.
But the manner in which Hatch's agenda prerogativ,!s could have affected the
outcome of an unconsidered policy issue is not at all certain. This is particularly
so for issues where the preferences of Hatch and the pivotal voters were to the left
of existing law (e.g., Weicker's legislation to protect the mentally ill). Under such
conditions, the outcome of committee deliberations wiil depend in large part on
the bargaining advantages and skills of the relevant legislators. And, as discussed
above, committee members can always force an item onto the agenda or offer
legislation that has been successfully blocked in committee as an amendment to
some other measure on the Senate floor. Circumstances c:xisted in which committee
liberals had both the incentive and the leverage nece~sary to challenge Hatch's
control and force their own preferences into legislation. However, it can be very
71. In the fall of 1985, however, Kennedy was able to partially circumvent Hatch's agenda preroga·
tives by attaching the legislation to the Labor Committee's reconciliation bill . See id. at 167-68.
72 . ld. at 45-47 .
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difficult to predict the variables that determine whether these and other similar
conditions would have prevailed: factors such as the intensity of support for a
liberal proposal in committee, the degree of support on the floor, the content of
both liberal and conservative alternatives, and the extent of contentment with the
status quo. Each of these factors played a key role in determining whether committee liberals would have been willing to risk a frontal challenge to Hatch, and
whether such a challenge could have been successfully waged in committee or
on the floor. With respect to an issue that never actually confronted committee
mt;mbers, we cannot predict with precision how those variables ultimately would
have played out. Therefore, it is problematic to reconstruct either the manner in
which leadership would have influenced the outcome, or the outcome itself.
Agenda Control on the Floor. 73 Our second case study pertains to the role of agenda
prerogatives during floor deliberations. In 1985 the Senate considered a bill to
reauthorize the Clean Water Act. Much of the conflict surrounding the reauthorization focused on a sewage treatment grant program that provided $2.4 billion in
federal money to local governments each year. As is often the case in Congress,
conflict about the sewage treatment grant program focused on the issue of how to
allocate these funds to the various states.
In the Senate the reauthorization bill was referred to the Environment and
Public Works Committee where the critical players were Robert Stafford of Vermont (chairman), John Chafee (Repub.-Rhode Island) (subcommittee chair),
George Mitchell of Maine (subcommittee ranking minority member), and Lloyd
Bentsen (Dem.-Texas) (ranking minority member of the full panel). Formal action
began when Bentsen expressed deep concerns about the new allocation formula.
Texas had not done well under the old allotment, and he wanted to increase
funding for his constituents.
The political task facing committee leaders was to devise a formula that would
benefit Texas, but also increase funding for a majority of senators in committee
and in the full chamber so that the allotment formula as a whole could be passed.
Although staff to Stafford, Bentsen, Chafee, and Mitchell eventually settled on a
formula that met the necessary political criteria, a number oflarge industrial states
were made worse off by the new numbers.
Two of the losers, New York and Minnesota, were represented on the Environment and Public Works panel, and dissention broke out during a committee
meeting, with Daniel Patrick Moynihan (Dem.-New York) and Dave Durenberger (Rep.-Minnesota) voicing opposition. The committee leadership had the
votes in committee, however, and the legislation containing the new allocation
formula was reported by a 13-to-2 margin, with Moynihan and Durenberger
casting the only nays. Unable to exert their will in the Environment and Public
Works Committee, the Durenberger-Moynihan forces moved their battle to the
full Senate.
73. The following description of Senate consideration of the sewage treatment grant program during
1985 is drawn from in-depth interviews with committee staff members who participated in the process.
For a discussion of these interviews, see EvANS, supra note 57.
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The sewage treatment grant issue illustrates very well th•: importance of agenda
prerogatives on the Senate floor because there existed an in finite number of potential allotment formulas, and for each and every one it wa:; technically feasible to
devise an alternative that would improve the relative position of a majority of
states . Since members tended to vote for the alternative that granted their constituents the largest portion of the allotment formula pie, there existed no formula
that could not be defeated by some alternative.
After committee action on the bill, for example, Dure:1berger and Moynihan
responded to the committee-passed formula by devising an amendment that would
have increased funding for a majority of states relative to the ommittee bill. However,
compared to the formula in what was then existing law, a m<jority of states did better
under the status quo than under the proposed Durenberger-Moynihan amendment.
Thus, if matters had come to a vote, it was expected that (1: the committee formula
would have defeated current law; (2) the Durenberger· Moynihan amendment
would have defeated the committee formula; and (3) cunent law would have defeated the Durenberger-Moynihan amendment . This is an c:xample of the "paradox
of voting," or "Arrow's Paradox." As a result of such dymmics, the order in which
the alternatives were considered would determine the outcome. 74 Control over the
agenda was critical. As one committee aide involved in the issue recalled,
If you can manipulate the parliamentary situation so that [a particular order for consider-

ing amendments] is the choice presented, then you can just continue to roll. If you have
the analytic capacity to do it, if you know what the factors are, [then] you know what
the political consequences are. It's also possible to do it in such a cynical way that you
can destroy someone who opposes you-[in a way] that just wipes out a state . We didn't
reach that ground, but we had formulas available that coul :1 have done that. 7$

Party leaders in the Senate often defer to the relevartt committee leaders on
scheduling. As a result, the committee leaders on Environment and Public Works
expected to have more say than Durenberger or Moynihan about the order of
consideration of the various allotment formulas on the Sc:nate floor. However, as
mentioned above, procedural prerogatives in the Senate a:e remarkably dispersed.
Consequentially, the Durenberger-Moynihan forces were able to respond by
threatening to filibuster the entire reauthorization unlc:ss their interests in the
funding criteria were somehow accommodated .
The sewage treatment grant program was just a small part of the legislation,
and there was considerable support in the Senate for reauthorizing the Clean
Water Act . As a result, a meeting was held between the key senators and a
compromise allotment formula was devised, which ther passed the Senate. The
final agreement gave states like New York and Minneso1 a more money than they
would have achieved under the original committee bill, but less than they would
have received under the Durenberger-Moynihan substitute.
74. For useful introduction to the paradox of voting and the importance of agenda control, see
H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM (1982) and fARB'R & FRICKEY LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE, supra note 16.
75. Interview with C . L. Evans.
WILLIAM
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Clearly, control over the agenda was crucial to the outcome of the allotment
formula controversy. And because procedural prerogatives are so dispersed in the
Senate, the committee leaders, party leaders, and Durenberger and Moynihan all
influenced the process of floor consideration to a certain extent. However, the final
outcome was not preordained. It turned on many factors, including the degree of
support for cloture, the potential willingness of committee leaders to risk the entire
bill to retain their formula, the intensity of the opposition from Duren berger and
Moynihan, and the salience of the allotment formula issue to other senators. What
if our task was to determine how the Senate would have voted on another formula
entirely-a formula that was not even considered? Could we reliably ascertain
whether the tools of agenda control would have been sufficient for the committee
leaders' preferences to defeat such an unconsidered formula? Could we reconstruct
how the forces in support of such a formula would have used their own agenda
resources, and whether that strategy would have been successful?
The answers to these questions are unclear. The strategic calculations that
govern the degree to which agenda control prerogatives are capable of influencing
outcomes and the manner in which they do affect those outcomes vary significantly
from issue to issue. When an entirely new policy alternative is put into the mix,
not only do subjective policy preferences change, but also the way those preferences
are assembled into law. As a result, the predicted outcome may bear little or no
resemblance to the scenario that Congress may have actually followed.

* * * * * *
Thus, the agenda control structures that Congress has instituted are directly
and fundamentally relevant to the issue of legislative intent. These mechanisms
not only determine how subjective preferences are translated into policy, but also
have the potential to result in outcomes that cannot be explained by preferences
alone. However, as suggested by the case studies on the Senate Labor and Human
Resources Committee and the Clean Water Act reauthorization, a court cannot
be expected to predict with much precision the interplay of agenda prerogatives
with policy alternatives that were not directly considered by Congress. Each of
these examples reveals that agenda prerogatives are diffuse, and that uncertainty
accompanies this diffusion. The amount of influence that a coalition can exert over
outcomes is contingent on a wide array of factors, each of which varies in different
ways with respect to different issues. Therefore, the task of reconstructing how
Congress would have responded to an unconsidered issue is always difficult and
often impossible.

III. Conclusion
Legislative intent cannot be understood by reference to policy preferences alone.
Rather, the fundamentally majoritarian system that converts those preferences
into law is an integral part of the concept of legislative intent. Indeed, because
these internal structures are capable of engineering a result that is not necessarily
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consistent with subjective member preferences, any search for legislative intent
that disregards those structures does so at the risk of mis .nterpretation.
In the context of "imaginative reconstruction," i.e., the effort to predict how
Congress would have resolved an issue it did not actually consider, the necessity
of considering congressional structure results in turmoil ar.d confusion. Although
institutional arrangements exert a demonstrable influence over policy outcomes,
they do so in ways that are not easily predictable. These arrangements create a
diffuse yet irregular distribution of power in the Congres; and, as a result, how
this power is exercised varies significantly. Therefore, it is not clear that a judicial
or administrative interpreter can reliably reconstruct legislative intent with respect
to unresolved issues. Also, absent compelling evidence that Congress intended a
particular outcome, statutory interpretation can be largely a matter of guess work.
While these assertions may not at first glance seem to s:ty much about Chevron
and the surrounding debate over statutory interpretation, their implications are
profound. As the examples in this article have demonstrated, congressional procedures play a crucial role in determining outcomes in the legislative process. Therefore, their relevance to the issue of legislative intent, and t1e prediction of legislative outcomes, is beyond cavil. The fact that the precise ef'ect of these procedures
cannot be gauged means that the search for legislative int1:nt on issues not placed
before the legislature can be akin to a wild goose chase. In this respect, Chevron
strikes a comfortable balance between what we can predic1 and what we cannota balance that is confirmed by the realities of the legislative process.
The question remains whether courts or agencies are bt:tter suited to fill in the
gaps left behind by Congress. The balance of powers side of the Chevron debate is
largely about this question. Chevron supporters argue that executive agencies are
charged with implementing statutes, and they work closely with Congress in tailoring statutory schemes. The executive branch is therd)re in a better position
than the courts to answer questions to which Congress has not provided clear
76
textual answers. Furthermore, statutory ambiguities that require judicial recourse to nonstatutory sources are essentially policy matters, which are in the
purview of the agencies, rather than the courts. 77 Finally, if Congress is dissatisfied
with agency interpretations, it may enact more specific and precise statutes.
Chevron opponents claim that legislative ambiguity or incompleteness should not
be equated with an affirmative act of delegation to an ag•:ncy. 78 Because there is

76. See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 1' 3 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 574-75
(1985); Pierce, supra note 26, at 307; Richard Posner, Economics, PolitiCJ, and the Reading of Statutes and
the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 272 (1982); Kenneth W. Starr, judicial Review in the PostChevron Era, 3 YALE]. ON REG. 283, 307-10 (1986). But see Scalia, sujra note 4, at 514 ("If it is, as
we have always believed, the constitutional duty of the courts to say what the law is, we must search
for something beyond relative competence as a basis for ignoring that Jrinciple when agency action
is at issue.").
77. Diver, supra note 76, at 583-84; Pierce, supra note 26, at 307-08 Starr, supra note 76, at 308.
But see Scalia, supra note 4, at 515.
78. "Chevron offers no evidence to support its conclusion that silenc: or unclarity in a regulatory
statute typically represents Congress's deliberate delegation of mean ng-elaboration power to the
agency." Farina, supra note 6 at 470.
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a wide variety of explanations for legislative ambiguity, 79 and because statutes are
often deliberately vague, 80 it is inappropriate to assume that congressional silence
is inevitably equivalent to agency delegation. 81 Chevron therefore misreads congressional preferences to undermine the judicial role. 82
It is beyond the scope of this article to settle all aspects of the Chevron dispute.
Nonetheless, our examination of the internal structures of Congress helps clarify
this dispute. Specifically, the critical but complex role played by congressional
procedures and structures cautions against efforts to read tea leaves to ascertain
nonspecified legislation objectives. Chevron's demand that Congress speak to "the
precise question at issue" seems sensible. Whether courts or agencies should be
the ones to flesh out legislative details is a matter we leave to the legions presently
engaged in the Chevron battlefield.

79. Pierce, supra note 26, at 305.
80. Randy E. Barnett, Forward: judicial Conservatism v. A Principled judicial Activism, 10 HARV. J. L.
& Pus. PoL'v 273, 288 (1987).
81. See Farina, supra note 6, at 460-61:
One need not have a deconstructionist's belief in the indeterminacy of language or a public choice
theorist's conviction in the inevitability of statutory vagueness to appreciate that, if the court's
independent role ends whenever ambiguity is discovered or analogy must be employed, the agency's
judgment will virtually always control the interpretive outcome.
See also Pierce, supra note 26, at 305 (''The general proposition that Congress cannot and does not resolve
all the policy issues raised by its creation of a regulatory scheme probably is not at all controversial.'').
82. Chevron opponents, moreover, argue that the decision, rather than providing incentives for
positive institutional reform, actually raises the costs of effective government by ceding too much power
to the executive. See FARBER & FRICKEY, LAw AND Pusuc CHOICE, supra note 16, at 92-95. See also
Eskridge, supra note 4, at 683-84; Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, supra note 16,
at 458-59.
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